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1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Sylvania opinion is the leading case among those of the Burger
Court that signal a pragmatic, economics-oriented antitrust policy. See also Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610
(1977); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
2. A vertical restriction is one imposed from one level of trade to another, typically by a
manufacturer on his retail dealers. A nonprice vertical restriction imposes some restraint on deal-
ers other than on their ability to set retail prices. Nonprice restrictions include requirements that
dealers sell only in certain territories ("territorial restrictions"), or to certain customers ("customer
restrictions"), or for only certain uses ("use restrictions"), or from specified locations ("location
restrictions"). Sylvania was a case of location restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on his deal-
ers, restrictions held to be lawful except when shown to have an anticompetitive effect. 433 U.S. at
59. A manufacturer might also assign a dealer an "area of primary responsibility," outside of
which the dealer could sell only when the sales within the primary area were adequate. Profit
pass-over contracts are similar, but require a dealer selling outside his assigned area to pay some
portion of his profits to the dealer in whose area he has sold. Restrictions can also be imposed on
a manufacturer by contract with his dealers. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECnON, MONO-
GRAPH No. 2: VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LiMrrmN INTRABRAND COMPETITON 3-5 (1977). Be-
cause all such restraints affect competition between sellers of the same brand of product, they are
termed "intrabrand restraints" or "intraband restrictions." Intrabrand restraints may also be im-
posed "horizontally"-for example, when competing dealers agree to fix the price of a particular
product, or when competitors form a joint venture to establish and sell a brand with restrictions on
the number of sellers in a given territory. See note 15 infra.
The characterization of a restraint as vertical or horizontal is less important than an under-
standing of whether the restraint affects only competition between sellers of a single brand-
intrabrand competition-or also affects competition in the sale of different brands-interbrand
competition. The discussion in this article is therefore applicable not only to vertical restraints but
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under the rule of reason rather than under the per se rule.3
The Sylvania opinion is noteworthy for its candor; the decision to
overrule United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 4 explicitly, rather than
distinguish it artificially,5 was a refreshing change in an antitrust analy-
sis that has too long supported spurious distinctions. 6 Overruling
also to cases in which dealers agree among themselves to restrict competition in the sale of a single
brand, cases that are typically treated as horizontal restraints. For a typical case of this type, see
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
3. The classic definition of the "rule of reason" analysis of antitrust case law was given by
Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or proba-
ble. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the re-
verse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to pre-
dict consequences.
Id. at 238.
In contrast, the per se rule requires no consideration of effect; it applies instead to "agree-
ments whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of
the industry is needed to establish their illegality-4hey are 'illegalper se. " National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
4. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruledinpart, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977).
5. The Court rejected an argument made both in Justice White's concurrence, 433 U.S. at
59, and in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion in Sylvania, 537 F.2d 980,
989-90 (9th Cir. 1976), a.f'don other grounds, 433 U.S. 36 (1977), that Schwnn was distinguisha-
ble. Justice White contended that location clauses present "less potential for restraint of in-
trabrand competition and more potential for stimulating interbrand competition," 433 U.S. at 59
(White, J., concurring), than do the territorial and customer restrictions held per se unlawful in
Schwhnn. Because the dealer-services rationale, see text accompanying notes 40-45 infra, supports
location clauses and territorial and customer restrictions, determining their net effect centers on
common analysis, and the majority in Sylvania was therefore correc in tearing down the Schwinn
per se barrier so that each type of restraint can be analyzed in terms of its net effect in the context
in which it is employed. This leaves open the possibility that the rule of reason, as applied, will
treat various forms of restrictions differently. See Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: AntitrustAnalysis
ofNon-Pice VerticalRestrIctions, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1978) (suggesting per se rules, or rules of
presumptive illegality, for some forms of intrabrand restrictions). Indeed, in Sylvania the Court
did "not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify
per se prohibition." 433 U.S. at 58.
6. The Schwinn opinion itself created an artificial and widely condemned distinction be-
tween vertical restrictions imposed in a sales transaction (illegal per se), 388 U.S. at 376, and
vertical restrictions imposed in a consignment arrangement (analyzed under the rule of reason),
id. at 380. See, eg., Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to
Where?, 44 ANTTRUST LJ. 537, 537-38 (1975); Handler, he Twentieth AnnualAntitrust Revew--
1967, 53 VA. L. REv. 1667, 1682-84 (1967); Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After
Schwinn, 63 Nw. U. L. Ray. 595, 599-600 (1968). The Sylvania Court noted the artificiality of this
distinction to support its decision to overrule rather than distinguish Schwinn. 433 U.S. at 56-57.
Moreover, the inconsistency between the Schwinn per se rule for vertical territorial and customer
restrictions and the rule of reason applied to other intrabrand restrictions put pressure on courts to
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Schwinn's per se rule against vertical restraints on territories and cus-
tomers properly shed a mischievous precedent.7 More fundamentally,
in Sylvania the Court seemed to embrace, for the first time, two postu-
lates long advanced by critics of antitrust policy: that the goal of anti-
trust policy should be to promote consumer welfare,8 and that because
market efficiencies advance consumer welfare, antitrust policy should
foster business practices that increase market efficiency.9 At the same
time, the Court made it clear that the substantial advantages of the per
se rule'0-- certainty, ease of application, and deterrence-would not be
purchased at the price of arbitrary or inadvisable results.1
Despite the significant advances that Sylvania initiated in antitrust
doctrine generally, the doctrine surrounding intrabrand restrictions 12
remains unsatisfactory.13 Although the Sylvania Court adopted a rule-
expand the per se rule and, by exposing the potential breadth of the Schwinn doctrine, under-
mined support for it. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 997-
1000 (9th Cir. 1976), af'd on other ground, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
7. As the Supreme Court noted in Sylvania, "Schwin has been the subject of continuing
controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals and in the federal courts. The great
weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the decision, and a number of the federal courts
confronted with analogous vertical restrictions have sought to limit its reach." 433 U.S. 47-48
(footnotes omitted). See id. at 48 nn. 13 & 14.
8. Although the Court was not explicit on this point, the following footnote appears to as-
sume that position: "Competitive economies have social and political as well as economic advan-
tages... but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks." 433 U.S. at 53 n.21. The Court seemed to reject the view that, without regard to
competitive effects, "the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of
independent businessmen." Id. The Court endorsed the economic orientation of antitrust analy-
sis again in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and National Soe'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-91 n.16 (1978). For the view that Sylvania should
not be read to preclude an antitrust doctrine based on non-economic goals, see Bohling, A Simpli-
fiedRule oflReasonfor VerticalRestraints: Integrating Social Goal, EconomicAnalyst, and Sylva-
nia, 64 IowA L. REV. 461 (1979).
9. See 433 U.S. at 54-56.
10. On the virtues of per se rules in the context of vertical restraints, see Louis, VerticalDistri-
bution Restraints after Sylvania: A Postscrpt and Comment, 76 MICH. L. Rav. 265 (1977); Louis,
Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing
Use ofa PartialPer Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REv. 275, 277-79 (1976); Pitofsky, supra note 5, at
12-14, 33-34.
11. "Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is mani-
festly anticompetitive." 433 U.S. at 49-50. "[D]eparture from the rule-of-reason standard must be
based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than--as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line
drawing." Id. at 58-59. The advantages of per se rules "are not sufficient in themselves to justify
the creation ofper se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced toper se
rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law." Id. at 50 n.16. The
Supreme Court further delineated the scope and role of per se rules in Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979);
National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
12. See a discussion of the doctrine at note 2 supra.
13. The antitrust analysis of intrabrand restrictions has had a disorderly development. Con-
tractual restrictions on resale prices were held unlawful in 1911, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
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of-reason analysis for nonprice vertical restraints, it reaffirmed, without
adequate explanation, both the per se rule prohibiting resale price
maintenance14 and the per se rule prohibiting potential competitors
who create a new brand through lawful integration 5 from restricting
competition in the sale of that brand. 16 Moreover, the rule-of-reason
standard the Court established to deal with nonprice vertical restraints
is unworkable: to say, as the Court did, that "the factfinder weighs all
of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on compe-
tition"17 offers no guidance unless the relevant circumstances and the
weight to be given them are identified. They were not.18 Although rec-
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), but Congress granted an exemption to state-sanctioned fair
trade programs in 1937 (the Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952))) and 1952 (the McGuire Act, Pub. L. No. 542, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952))), only to withdraw the exemption and restore full per se treatment in 1976
(Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1976))). California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980). Restrictions on territories and customers, however, were not dealt with by the
Supreme Court (or, with any frequency, by lower courts) until 1964 when, in White Motors v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that it did not know enough
about such restrictions to articulate a governing rule of law before trial. Yet only four years later,
without intervening Supreme Court precedent and with little development in the lower courts, the
Court, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967), declared that vertical
restrictions on customers and territories in sales transactions are per se unlawful, a rule that was
extended to intrabrand restrictions imposed by horizontal agreement in United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Other intrabrand restrictions have been dealt with under a rule
of reason and are upheld unless proven to be unlawfully restrictive. See generally ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, supra note 2, at 20-25.
14. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
15. Integration generally comes in one of two forms, exemplified by two major cases. United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), involved a group of relatively small grocery store
chains in various parts of the country that formed a joint buying agency to achieve the cost econo-
mies and promotional benefits of having their own private brand. The territorial restrictions they
placed on their resale of the brand were deemed to be horizontal restraints and were therefore per
se unlawful. In United States v. Scaly, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), a group of mattress manufactur-
ers in different regions of the country were licensed to produce and sell mattresses under a na-
tional brand name, with attendant standards and quality control. Their agreements to maintain
resale prices and divide territories were also held unlawful per se.
16. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28. These inconsistencies are discussed in Bork, Vertical Restraints:
Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171, 189-92, and Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
EconomicApproach. Relections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1977). The
author's view on the difference between price and nonprice restraints is outlined in the text accom-
panying notes 61-93 infra.
17. 433 U.S. at 49.
18. The Court's citation, id. at 49 & n.15, to the famous but amorphous quotation from
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied
.") provides little elaboration of the rule-of-reason standard. The difficulty of formulating
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ognizing that nonprice intrabrand restrictions might promote distribu-
tional efficiency, and hence presumably further competition, the Court
completed only half of the rule-of-reason analysis because it was un-
able to say in what ways intrabrand restrictions are anticompetitive. 19
Sylvania simply turned the clock back to 1963, when the Court origi-
nally rejected a per se rule against vertical restraints.20 As was true
then, the Court still does "not know enough of the economic and busi-
ness stuff out of which these arrangements emerge" 2' to fashion a
workable doctrine.
This article argues that antitrust doctrine concerning intrabrand
restrictions is unsatisfactory because the economic theory of intrabrand
restrictions has been only partially developed and articulated. An un-
filled and largely unacknowledged analytical gap exists between the
view that intrabrand restraints are generally anticompetitive 22 and the
view that intrabrand restraints are generally efficiency-producing.23
meaningful jury instructions under this standard is apparent in First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal
Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980).
19. After noting that "[tihe market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their
potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand
competition," 433 U.S. at 51-52, the Court summarized "[the] substantial scholarly and judicial
authority supporting [the] economic utility" of vertical restrictions, noting, also, the "relatively
little authority to the contrary." Id. at 57-58. The Court acknowledged the view of some theorists
that manufacturer-imposed intrabrand restrictions are always pro-competitive but, without expla-
nation or citation, dismissed that view as one 'not universally shared." Id. at 56. Rather than
discussing the anticompetitive implications of nonprice intrabrand restrictions, however, the Court
moved on to justify its decision to overrule Schwinn on the ground that the Schwinn distinction
between sale and consignment transactions was untenable.
20. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
21. Id. at 263.
22. See, ag., Bohling, supra note 8, at 505-07; Carstensen, Vertical Restraints and the
Schwinn Doctrine. Rulesfor the Creation and Dissipation of Economic Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 771 (1976); Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 28-31; Strasser, Vertical Territorial Restraints After
Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977 DuKE L.J. 775, 801-02. Several com-
mentators have advanced the view that intrabrand restraints are anticompetitive because they
induce dealers to engage in promotional product differentiation that insulates the manufacturer
from price competition. See, ag., Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White
Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1422-25 (1968); Louis, Vertical Distributional
Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania, supra note 10, at 281. That view, however, is "flawed by
its necessary assumption that a large part of the promotional efforts resulting from vertical restric-
tions will not convey socially desirable information about product availability, price, quality, and
services." 433 U.S. at 56 n.25.
23. See, eg., R. BORK, THE ANrITRUST PARADOX, 288-98 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 147-67 (1976); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE LJ. 373, 403 (1966); Goldberg, The Law andEconomics of VerticalRestrictions.:
A Relational Perspective, 58 TX. L. REv. 91, 92, 129 (1979); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: AnAnalysi ofthe RestrictedDistribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Compe-
tition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 293-94 (1975); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrange-
ments: Economic Analysis andPublic Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 506, 511-12
(1965); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960); William-
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That gap is the failure to explore how a manufacturer benefits from
intrabrand restraints other than by increasing the profitability of his
dealers. This article attempts to fill that gap by drawing on the theory
of imperfect competition 24 to explain why manufacturers find it profita-
ble to restrict intrabrand competition in an anticompetitive way. Using
this analysis, the article explains why price restraints should indeed be
treated differently from nonprice restraints2s and formulates an analyti-
cal approach under the rule of reason for addressing nonprice vertical
restraints.26 Non-economic analyses are possible,27 but are not treated
here. Th6 approach of this article rests on economic theory.
I. INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS
A. Traditional Explanations.
For years, economists have attempted to explain why a manufac-
turer would restrict competition between his dealers28 and thus give up
the additional sales that such competition would presumably bring.29
son, Assessing Vertical Market Restrctions Antitrust Ramfcations of the Transaction Cost Apa
proach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (1979).
24. The theory of imperfect cqmpetition posits that actual or perceived differences between
goods may give particular brands market power by insulating them somewhat from competition.
See generally E. CHAmaERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLSTIC COMPETITION (8th ed. 1962); J.
ROBINSON, THE EcONOMICS OF IMPERFECT CoMPEmroN (2d ed. 1969).
The central thesis of the article--that reduced intrabrand competition decreases consumer
welfare by denying important choices to consumers without providing better services--has been
mentioned, but not fully developed, by others. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 379 (1977); Strasser, supra note 22, at 794. See also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUsT ANALYSiS
504 (2d ed. 1974) ("resale price maintenance eliminates dealer price competition that might possi-
bly generate dealer resistance to existing wholesale prices"); Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on
VerticalPice Fixing: A Rejoinder, 77 YALE LJ. 936, 941 (1968); Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork
on Vertical Pice Fixing, 76 YALE LJ. 722, 725-26 (1967).
25. This article addresses only agreements fixing minimum prices. For a good argument that
Sylvania can and should be read to overrule the per se rule against maximum price-fixing, see
Halligan, GTE Sylvania: The Casefor Overriding Albrecht v. Herald Co., 39 Omo ST. L. 496
(1978).
26. See also Bohling, su.pra note 8; Denger, VerticalRestrictions: The Impact of Sylvania, 46
ANTITRUST LJ. 908 (1978); Stewart & Roberts, Viabilify of the Antitrust Per Se illegalily Rule:
Schwinn Down, How Many To Go?, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 727 (1980); Strasser, supra note 22; Zelck,
Stern, & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. Rv. 13 (1980).
27. See, ag., Bohling, sufpra note 8; Flynn, Commentary: The Function andDysfimctlon offer
Se Rules in VerticalMarket Restraints, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 767 (1980).
28. For simplicity, the discussion in the text is presented in the context of direct distribu-
tion-the sale by a manufacturer directly to retail dealers for resale to consumers. Distribution
through wholesalers, distributors, or jobbers to retail dealers for resale to consumers has special
ramifications, see text accompanying notes 89-93 infra, but does not change the basic analysis.
"Dealers" in the text means dealers in one or more, but not all, brands of a given product. Thus, a
consumer electronics dealer might sell several brands (such as Sony, Zenith, Pioneer) of one prod-
uct (such as stereo amplifiers).
29. See, eg., P. ARBEDA, supra note 24, at 500-01; Telser, supra note 23, at 86-87.
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One explanation--the "manufacturer's cartel" theory-states that com-
peting manufacturers may find that intrabrand restrictions facilitate
collusive or interdependent pricing at the manufacturing level by re-
moving the uncertainty caused by shifting dealer prices, thus allowing
larger manufacturer profits.30 Intrabrand restraints imposed under the
manufacturer's cartel theory do not produce efficiencies, and are ui-
doubtedly unlawful.31 These restraints are, however, apparently un-
common and are of little concern as long as they can be distinguished
from intrabrand restrictions with other purposes and effects.32
In the absence of a manufacturer's cartel, intrabrand restrictions
are generally considered a means of increasing the dealer's margin (the
difference between the price a dealer pays for the goods and the price at
which he sells them);33 most commentators have therefore focused their
analysis of such restrictions by asking why a manufacturer would allow
larger dealer margins than would occur with unrestrained dealer com-
petition.34 Two theories have been advanced. 35 The "dealer carter'
30. For slightly differing perspectives on the manufacturer's-cartel rationale, compare R.
Bornn, THE ANTITRUST PARADox, .s'upra note 23, at 293-95, and Bork, The Rule of Reason, supra
note 23, at 411-15 with Posner,.Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court, supra note 23, at 294, and
Williamson, supra note 23, at 967.
31. Cf. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277-79 (1942) (the use of patent and
marketing restrictions by a cartel are unlawful); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940) (per se rule applied to horizontal agreement to remove excess supply from the
market). Similarly, the fair trade exemption was applicable only to commodities in "free and
open competition with commodities of the same general class .... 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1970)
(repealed 1975).
32. The Supreme Court, however, appears to base the per se rule against resale price mainte-
nance in part on the manufacturer's-cartel theory. See text accompanying notes 62-65 infra.
33. See, eg., M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRATEoY, AND BILATERAL MARKET
PowER 63 (1976) (resale price maintenance must profit either the dealers or the manufacturer, the
former is said to be the usual presumption); RESALE PRICE MANmENANCE 3 (B. Yamey ed. 1966).
34. Several reasons for intrabrand restrictions are unrelated to either a manufacturer's cartel
or to increasing the dealer's margin, but they do not appear to have significant policy implications.
A manufacturer may want to improve the image or prestige of his product by maintaining high
resale prices as a connotation of quality. L. SuLtavAN, supra note 24, at 384. Whether this is in
fact a motivation for imposing resale price maintenance, and why a manufacturer could not
achieve the same effect directly by charging high prices to dealers, are unclear. In any event,
society has no economic interest in protecting resale price maintenance or other intrabrand restric-
tions that are so motivated.
Intrabrand restrictions have also been viewed as decreasing the risk dealers face and thus
decreasing capital costs, but this is generally not considered any greater justification for intrabrand
restrictions than it would be for interbrand restrictions. See Comanor, supra note 22 at 1428-29.
Professor Louis, however, argues that vertical restraints might be justified on this ground for new
entrants and failing firms because of the long-run benefit of their presence in the market as an
interbrand competitor. Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania,
supra note 10, at 297.
Finally, by separating customers with different demand elasticities, some forms of intrabrand
restrictions-particularly territorial and customer restrictions-may facilitate discrimination be-
tween customers. This appears to be a possibility without policy implications in any direction.
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theory holds that a manufacturer may be forced to impose distribution
restrictions by a dealer cartel.36 If dealers refuse to distribute a manu-
facturer's goods unless he guarantees them freedom from intrabrand
competition, the manufacturer may relinquish some of his profit to the
dealers as the price for getting his product distributed. In such cases,
the manufacturer is merely the "cat's paw" of the dealer cartel.37 Diffi-
culties of identification and proof complicate any analysis of the dealer-
cartel problem, 38 but once identified, such cartels are readily held to be
unlawful.39
The -"dealer services" explanation for intrabrand restrictions holds
that a manufacturer restricts intrabrand competition to induce his deal-
ers to undertake greater nonprice competition by using, for example,
advertising, showrooms, product demonstrations, and warranty and re-
pair services.4 Under this view, such activities increase consumer wel-
See, ag., R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 23, at 295, 394-401; Bowman, Resale
Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 825, 839-40 (1955). But see Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 31-32
(suggesting that a manufacturer's prohibition of sales by dealers to the manufacturer's customers,
which may facilitate discrimination, is per se unlawful).
35. The two categories come from R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 148. Other possibilities can-
not be discounted. Intrabrand restrictions may be used to compensate dealers for agreeing not to
sell competing brands, in which event the legality of the intrabrand restraint may turn on the
legality of the resulting exclusive dealing arrangement. M. PORTER, supra note 33, at 59. Profes-
sor Caves, in an analysis that in some respects parallels the analysis in this article, argues that
intrabrand restrictions may reflect the market power of dealers and arise from joint profit-maxi-
mizing through bargaining. Caves, Vertical Restraints as Integration by Contract: Evidence and
Policy Implications, forthcoming in The Journal of Industrial Economics (on file with the author).
36. R. BOiRc, THE ANTTRUST PARADOX, supra note 23, at 292; R. POSNER, supra note 23, at
148; Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 28-30.
37. R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 148.
38. As Professor Posner has argued, because dealers are in a good position to evaluate con-
sumer demand, they have a legitimate need to communicate with the manufacturer concerning the
free-rider problem and dealer delivery of services. R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 165. If a manu-
facturer imposes intrabrand restraints in response to such communication the situation may look
like a dealer cartel even though the manufacturer is acting only to increase dealer services, see text
accompanying notes 41-42 infra, not dealer profits. See, eg., Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625
F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussions between manufacturer and dealer prior to restraints are not
themselves proof of unlawful dealers' agreements). On the other hand, true dealer cartels-those
that attempt to increase dealer profits without increasing dealer services-may be imperceptible.
See Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 31. The approach advocated in this article would avoid these
problems by sustaining any intrabrand restriction designed to increase dealer services and invali-
dating any restrictions designed to increase either manufacturer or dealer profits without inducing
services.
39. See, eg., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1917). Cf. United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal division of intrabrand markets is per se unlawful);
United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967) (territorial restraints imposed by a dealer cartel
were held unlawful, but because of their role as part of a series of price restraints).
40. The dealer-services rationale covers many types of efficiencies associated with intrabrand
restrictions. The inapplicability of the theory to resale price maintenance is discussed in the text
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fare and interbrand competition.4' Furthermore, the dealer-services
theory states that intrabrand restrictions are necessary to achieve those
purposes: no dealer would increase advertising and other customer
services if he thought that other dealers could cut prices and make
sales-take a "free ride"--on the basis of his promotional expendi-
tures.42
The dealer-services theory offers one reason why, even in the ab-
sence of a dealer cartel, a manufacturer would impose intrabrand re-
strictions, and why restrictions imposed for that reason enhance
competition.43 Writers of the so-called "Chicago school"44 have argued
that absent a dealer cartel both price and nonprice intrabrand restric-
tions must increase dealer services and promote competition, because a
manufacturer would never impose the restrictions unless they induced
demand-promoting, consumer-satisfying activities by his dealers.
These writers acknowledge the possibility of a dealer or a manufacturer
cartel, but assume that such cartels are infrequent and that they can be
separately identified and dealt with, or ignored.45 The Court, however,
has never fully endorsed the position taken by the Chicago school. Al-
though the Supreme Court adopted the dealer-services theory in Sylva-
nia to justify applying the rule-of-reason standard to nonprice
accompanying notes 72-86 infra; its applicability to nonprice restraints is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 118-29 infra. For informative descriptions of the theory, see Goldberg, supra
note 23, at 106-11; Williamson, supra note 23, at 975-80. One writer argues, however, that no
policy implications should be drawn from the dealer-services rationale. See L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 24, at 412-16.
41. See, eg., R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARAYOX, supra note 23, at 290-91 (1978); R. Pos-
NEr, su.pra note 23, at 148-50; Bork, The Rule ofReason, supra note 23, at 429-65.
42. Usually free riding occurs because consumers can get a service without having to buy the
product from the dealer who provides the service. For example, some high-fidelity equipment
dealers provide a listening room where customers can compare different stereo components. Once
he decides which brand to buy, a customer can then make the purchase from a discount dealer.
See R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 149.
43. If some consumers will purchase the product with or without dealer services, while other
consumers will purchase the product only with the services, a manufacturer imposing intrabrand
restraints to improve dealer services could conceivably increase his profits without increasing con-
sumer welfare; the welfare gain to those consumers who want services could be offset by the
welfare loss to those consumers who continue to buy the product but do not consider the services
valuable. Abbott, Paradox Regained- Toward a "New Economic Approach" to Vertical Restraints
Policy 8-9 (FTC Staff Paper on file with the Duke Law Journal). See also Spence, Product Dffler-
entiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 407 (1976) (product differentiation that is profitable for
the manufacturer may not increase consumer welfare). No one has offered, however, a practical
way to identify such situations.
44. See Posner, The Chicago School ofAnttrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1975).
45. See, ag., R. BoRK, THE ANrrRUST PARADO, supra note 23, at 292-95; Posner, The Next
Step in the Antitrust reatrent of Restricted Dstibution Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 6,
23-25 (1981).
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restraints," it failed to apply the same standard to price restraints. 47
Moreover, the Court apparently refused to accept the dealer-services
rationale as a complete explanation for nonprice restraints.48 Although
the Court's explanations are not persuasive,49 it reached the correct re-
sult. Resale price maintenance cannot be explained by the dealer-serv-
ices rationale;50 a separate rationale--the competitive-advantages
rationale--explains both the per se treatment of resale price mainte-
nance and the anticompetitive effects of nonprice restraints.
B. The Competitive-Advantages Explanation.
Although the cartel theories and the dealer-services theory un-
doubtedly fit some sets of facts, they ignore circumstances in which
manufacturers impose intrabrand restrictions to gain increased profits
by keeping their prices to dealers higher than otherwise would be possi-
ble, without expecting that dealers' margins or dealers' services will in-
crease. A manufacturer who, because of either product differentiation
or a cost advantage, enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals has the
potential to earn greater profits than he otherwise would.51 Without
intrabrand restraints, however, the profits resulting from a competitive
advantage could be lost through intrabrand competition.
If intrabrand competition is possible, the elasticity of demand52 for
a brand from a particular dealer usually exceeds the elasticity of de-
mand for the brand collectively because consumers can readily obtain
the identical brand from any dealer; a price decrease by any one dealer
should bring a substantial increase in sales by diverting customers from
rival dealers-a result that benefits the price-cutting dealer5 3 but not
46. 433 U.S. 36, 54-55.
47. Id. at 51 n.18.
48. Id. at 56 ("the view that the manufacturer's interest necessarily corresponds with that of
the public is not universally shared"); id. at 58 ("we do not foreclose the possibility that particular
applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se prohibitions..
49. See text accompanying notes 61-69 infra.
50. See text accompanying notes 72-84 infra.
51. The idea that differentiation among competing brands should make a difference in eco-
nomic analysis derives from the theory of imperfect competition. See note 24 supra. The recent
literature on product differentiation and market structure is reviewed in F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRucTuRE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ch. 14 (2d ed. 1980).
52. Price elasticity of demand is the ratio of the change in the quantity of a product de-
manded resulting from a change in the product's price. Landes & Posner, Market Power in Anti-
trust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937, 940 n.8 (1981).
53. A dealer will want to increase his sales whenever the marginal cost of additional sales is
less than the marginal revenue to be derived from additional sales. Under conditions of elastic
demand the dealer's price need be decreased only slightly to add additional sales; when his cost of
goods (the major portion of his marginal cost) is constant, the dealer is likely to view additional
sales as profitable ones. The profitability of additional sales is even greater if, as may often be the
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the manufacturer. Moreover, because dealers have different cost and
demand characteristics, 54 competition between dealers of the same
brand is likely;5 5 when it occurs, dealer margins will diminish. As mar-
gins shrink, dealers on the edge of profitability will either go out of
business, stop carrying the cut-price brand, or press the manufacturer
to reduce wholesale prices.
A manufacturer with a competitive advantage can cut his whole-
sale price and still earn a competitive profit; he is therefore especially
susceptible to pressure for lower prices if dealers can credibly threaten
to drop his brand otherwise. Because dealers are generally indifferent
to the brands of products they sell except to the extent that some brands
promise greater profit than others, they can indeed switch, or threaten
to switch, from selling one manufacturer's product to selling another's,
depending on which product offers the greatest potential profit. In ef-
fect, manufacturers buy distribution outlets, and they bid against each
other for the best outlets by offering the dealer profit potential.56 If a
manufacturer cannot offer his existing dealers as much profit as rival
manufacturers, the dealers will switch suppliers.57 Intrabrand competi-
tion thus results in downward pressure on the manufacturer's wholesale
prices.58
case, his marginal cost of selling (shelf space, employees, etc.) decreases with increasing output, or
if the manufacturer gives quantity discounts.
54. Some dealers will inevitably be more efficient or more aggressive than others; some will
have lower maintenance costs, or more attractive locations. In addition, the same brand is often
sold through different types of retailers, whose costs and sales strategies are likely to differ mark-
edly. See generaly M. PORTER, supra note 33, at 38-42.
55. See RESALE PaxcE MAINTENANCE, supra note 33, at 4-5. See also Comanor, supra note
22, at 1426. Manufacturers cannot selectively raise their wholesale prices to dealers to stop in-
trabrand competition, both because such refined price determinations are impractical, and be-
cause they might be unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). See
Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964). Cf. Interstate
Cigar Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,430 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a large discount to
new dealers does not adversely affect competition).
56. See, eg., R. BomK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADox, supra note 23, at 293; Note, Restricted
Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 795, 805-06 (1962).
Recent scholarship has emphasized that dealers derive bargaining power from the structure
of retailing markets and from the fact that dealer services are an important influence on consumer
demand. M. PORTER, supra note 33, at ch. 2. Whatever the relative bargaining strengths of retail-
ers and manufacturers, the competitive-advantages rationale explains that imposing intrabrand
restrictions maximizes the manufacturer's use of his bargaining power. Acknowledging the bar-
gaining power of dealers merely confirms the difficulty a manufacturer has in restricting in-
trabrand competition by charging high prices to his dealers.
57. But see note 92 infra.
58. Nor can a manufacturer easily replace a dealer threatening to drop his brand. A replace-
ment dealer will demand an adequate return just as the original dealer did. Losing a dealer's
outlet altogether would leave the manufacturer worse off, or else he would not have sold to that
dealer in the first place.
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No doubt dealers and manufacturers bluff to a degree about who
will switch away from whom, but in the aggregate dealers and manu-
facturers bargain toward an equilibrium at which the dealers' profit-
ability will be roughly equal for all the brands. If this equality were not
attained, dealers would make more money on some brands than others;
they would then have an incentive to drop a lower-profit brand and to
increase their volume of a higher-profit one or to press the manufac-
turer to lower his prices, and the cycle would start over. The cycle
ends---and equilibrium is reached-when no manufacturer can reduce
his wholesale price without selling below his own cost (including a
competitive profit). Manufacturer competition for dealers ends and no
dealer can credibly threaten to switch to a rival manufacturer. At this
equilibrium point, however, a manufacturer with a competitive advan-
tage cannot profit from that advantage.
Suppose, for example, that when a market is in equilibrium a
manufacturer introduces a new, more attractive brand. If the attrac-
tiveness results from quality differences that increase the manufac-
turer's production costs above those of his rivals, the manufacturer
should be able to charge proportionally higher wholesale prices; dealers
will charge higher retail prices but will earn the same profit as on the
lower-quality, lower-priced brands. Dealer pressure for lower whole-
sale prices will be ineffective and will eventually abate because no man-
ufacturer will have the ability or incentive to lower prices.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the attractiveness of the new
brand does not result from higher costs to the manufacturer but results
from, for example, strong brand-name recognition by consumers. If
the manufacturer can still charge the higher wholesale price, he will
earn a more-than-competitive profit. As dealers seek the equilibrium
retail price for the brand, however, they will compete with one another
and bargain for lower wholesale prices from the manufacturer. Two
circumstances put the dealers in a good bargaining position: first, the
manufacturer, by hypothesis, is earning unusually high profits and can
therefore afford to reduce his prices, and second, the dealers can force-
fully threaten to drop the brand or refuse to carry it initially. The like-
lihood that dealer pressure will succeed is thus much greater in these
circumstances than when the market is at equilibrium, and ultimately a
new equilibrium will be reached at which the manufacturer earns less
than he would if his dealers were not engaging in intrabrand competi-
tion. The manufacturer can avoid these pressures if he restricts compe-
tition among dealers.
Intrabrand restraints imposed by a manufacturer thus may be
neither a response to a dealer cartel nor an implementation of a legiti-
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mate desire to promote dealer services. Instead, they may be imposed
to enable the manufacturer to capture the profit arising from an advan-
tage that his product has over a rival's product, and to do so by elimi-
nating the possibility that his dealers will compete such profits away
through intrabrand competition. This is called the competitive-advan-
tages rationale.5 9 Restrictions imposed under the competitive-advan-
tages rationale are unjustifiable because they remove market forces that
would otherwise lower prices to consumers, without inducing greater
dealer services. Moreover, such restrictions are unnecessary to spur the
manufacturer to improve his product's quality or his efficiency; that
incentive comes from interbrand, not intrabrand, competition.60 Most
important, the competitive-advantages rationale for intrabrand re-
straints explains the Supreme Court's distinction between price and
nonprice restraints.
II. PRICE AND NONPRICE RESTRAINTS
The Sylvania Court's rationale for distinguishing price from non-
price restraints was Justice Brennan's concurring statement in White
Motor Co. v. United States61 that "[riesale price maintenance is not
only designed to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price com-
petition not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite as
59. The competitive-advantages rationale demonstrates that dealers need not form a cartel to
exercise their bargaining power over manufacturers. Instead, dealer pressure for lower wholesale
prices or intrabrand restraints results from individual reactions by dealers to the erosion of profits
from intrabrand competition. When the manufacturer imposes intrabrand restraints to forestall
such pressure the result is the same as that produced by a formal dealer cartel--except the manu-
facturer, not the dealers, gets the extra profit. Recent cases provide an accurate depiction of dealer
pressure that is unrelated to either formal dealer cartels or the free-rider problem. See, ag.,
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). See also H.L. Moore Drug
Exchange v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 1 62,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (relying on dealer com-
munication to deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but not considering whether
the communications related to a free-rider problem).
60. It cannot be argued convincingly that competitive advantages are too insignificant a phe-
nomenon to warrant attention. Compare Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the ShermanAct, and
Economic Welfare 4 Rel, to Professor Markovits, 28 STAN. L. REV. 903, 912 (1976) with Mar-
kovits, .4 Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REv. 919, 937-38 (1976). Even the dealer-
services theory assumes that individual brands have, or can obtain, some competitive advantage;
without market power derived from a competitive advantage, intrabrand restrictions would be
profitable for neither the manufacturer nor the dealer. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 149-
50; Bowman, supra note 34, at 848-49; Holahan, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 . ECON. THEORY
411 (1979) (a competitive manufacturer does not benefit from resale price maintenance); Preston,
supra note 23, at 518. Given the competitive-advantages rationale, it is not surprising to observe
that many of the products on which resale prices have been fixed are highly differentiated, widely
recognized brand names on which no dealer services are required. See, eg., Eastman Kodak Co.
v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947). Compare RESALE PICE
MAINTENANCE, supra note 33, at 67 with M. PORTER, supra note 33, at 23-30.
61. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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much between that product and competing brands. ' 62 This assertion is
unsupported,63 ambiguous, 64 and, at best, an argument supporting per
se treatment only in concentrated industries where the significant firms
engage in resale price-fixing through separate dealers.65 The Court's
additional assertion66 that Congress endorsed the per se rule as applica-
ble to resale price maintenance when it repealed the fair trade laws
67
also fails to support disparate treatment for price and nonprice re-
straints. 68 Thus, the Court provided no adequate answer for critics who
pointed out the apparent inconsistency of treating nonprice restraints,
which may prohibit both price and nonprice competition, less harshly
than price restraints, which prohibit only price competition.
69
When examined closely, however, differences in the effects of price
and nonprice restraints fully justify their disparate treatment. Briefly
stated, price restraints are almost always likely to be explained by the
competitive-advantages rationale and never by the dealer-services ra-
tionale. Price restraints are therefore appropriately treated under a per
se rule. Nonprice restraints, however, may be explained by the dealer-
services rationale and should therefore be treated under a rule-of-rea-
son analysis that seeks to measure the effect of the restraint.
62. Id. at 268 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
63. The sole support for Justice Brennan's statement was United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45-47 (1960), which is distinguishable because it analogized resale price mainte-
nance to a dealer cartel and concerned only decreased intrabrand competition.
64. If the statement by Justice Brennan means that resale price maintenance diverts in-
trabrand competition from price competition to service competition, it does not serve to distin-
guish price from nonprice restraints, and is inconsistent with the Court's simultaneous rejection of
the argument that product differentiation is necessarily contrary to consumer welfare. 433 U.S. at
56 n.25. If the statement means that resale price maintenance may support manufacturer carte-
lization, it is subject to severe limitations. See Bork, supra note 16,'at 190-91; Posner, supra note
16, at 7-8. But see Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 15-16.
65. See Posner, The Rule ofReason, supra note 16, at 7-8.
66. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
67. Congress repealed the fair trade laws in the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801, codfied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1,
45(a) (1970)).
68. See Bork, supra note 16, at 191-92; Posner, supra note 16, at 8-9. If Congress did legislate
a per se rule for vertical price fixing when it repealed the fair trade laws, the inference could be
drawn that it was bringing the law relating to price restraints into line with that relating to non-
price restraints, which at the time was governed in part by the per se rule of United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). If so, the overruling of Schwinn would be inconsis-
tent with Congress's intentions.
69. R. BoRt,, THE ANTrrusT PARADoX, supra note 23, at 288-91; Posner, supra note 45, at
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A. Resale Price Maintenance.
The defect in the theory supporting the legality of resale price
maintenance is the assumption that by diminishing price competition
the manufacturer stops free riding and induces competition in services
that is in his and the consumer's interests.70 In fact, resale price main-
tenance does not overcome the free-rider problem; nor does it induce
any nonprice competition that benefits consumers. Minimum price re-
straints can be explained only by the competitive-advantages rationale.
1. Nonprice Competition and Resale Price Maintenance. Resale
price maintenance cuts off price competition, the most effective means
of intrabrand rivalry and the form of rivalry that is most likely to re-
duce the manufacturer's profits from a competitive advantage. By con-
trast, the nonprice competition permitted under resale price
maintenance is often ineffectual; beyond some level of dealer services,
consumers will cease to respond to additional investment in services,
even if they would have responded to price decreases. 71 Indeed, when
resale prices are fixed and the manufacturer gives the dealers a margin
that is both competitive with that given by other manufacturers and
sufficient to provide the amount of dealer services the manufacturer
desires, the dealer's incentive to engage in intrabrand competition
through additional nonprice rivalry would appear to be small; if con-
sumer demand were responsive to dealer services, the manufacturer
would want them to be provided. Under these circumstances, resale
price maintenance reduces all pressure for lower wholesale prices.
2. Dealer Services and Resale Price Maintenance. Moreover, con-
70. See, eg., IL POSNER, supra note 23, at 148:
If the manufacturer fixes a minimum resale price that exceeds the cost of reselling his
product without... services, but non-price (Le., service) competition among the dealers
is not constrained, the dealers will step up such competition among themselves-ee.,
increase the provision of services .... They will continue to increase their outlays on
service competition until the marginal cost of distribution has risen to meet the resale
price. When that point is reached the dealers will not be receiving any monopoly profits
but will instead be furnishing the level of services desired by the manufacturer.
Id. Professor Posner thus makes it clear that the assumption of "effective non-price competition
among the dealers," id., is a prerequisite to the dealer-services rationale.
71. A dealer with a showroom, for example, is unlikely to attract customers from a rival
dealer by making the showroom even more lavish, but is able to attract customers from rival
dealers by continuing to reduce his prices. The relative ineffectiveness of nonprice competition as
a form ofintrabrand competition is implicit in much of the analysis of intrabrand restraints. Bow-
man, supra note 34, at 825, 830 n.29 (dealer cartels are content to fix only prices, without signifi-
cant concern that nonprice competition will subvert the profitability of cartels); Comanor, supra
note 22, at 1426 (a manufacturer cannot finance service competition by reducing prices to dealers
because dealers will instead engage in price competition); Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on
Vertical Pfice Fixing: A Rejoinder, supra note 24, at 941.
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trary to the Chicago school analysis, 72 a manufacturer is unable, by
fixing resale prices, to overcome any free-riding competition that un-
dermines desirable dealer services. Even after prices are fixed, a dealer
may take a free ride by offering an inexpensive increment of service or
value to take customers away from dealers who offer more expensive
services.
Suppose, for example, that one dealer offers a large showroom
with helpful, knowledgeable sales clerks. Even if resale prices are
fixed, another dealer can still take a free ride on those services by offer-
ing free gifts on each sale, free home delivery, or advantageous credit
terms, without ever investing in a showroom or sales-clerk training.7 3
Consumers can examine and try out the product with the first dealer
and then buy from the second. As long as the second dealer's bonus
has some attraction to consumers but costs less than the first dealer's
showroom and sales training, the second dealer can take a free ride at
the expense of the first. This free riding discourages the first dealer
from investing in the showroom-precisely the type of free-rider prob-
lem that price restrictions purportedly overcome.
Of course, if rivals are induced to increase services of some kind,
even if not showrooms, the suppression of price competition appears to
meet its objective of inducing dealer services. But this is hardly the
effective nonprice competition that supports the dealer-services ration-
ale. First, dealer services such as showrooms can be so easily undercut
by cheaper, free-riding nonprice competition like free gifts that no
dealer would have an incentive to provide the more expensive services.
Successive rounds of nonprice competition undercutting the expensive
dealer services of rivals would, in all probability, uniformly reduce
dealer services to those that could be provided at low cost.74 Second,
because services on which a free ride can be taken can be undercut by
services-like gifts-on which a free ride cannot be taken, the most
likely outcome of successive rounds of nonprice competition would be
an increase in the amount of dealer services on which free rides could
not be taken. Whether these services are valuable to consumers misses
the point; the market will generate these services in accordance with
72. See note 44 supra.
73. Such forms of nonprice competition were common when prices were fixed under the fair
trade laws. See, ag., Vomado v. Coming Glass Works, 388 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1968) (trading
stamps for fair-traded items); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, 142 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Mass. 1956) (trading stamps for fair-traded items); In re Schwanhausser, 52 F.T.C. 28 (1955)
(trade-in allowances given).
74. The fact that nonprice free-riding competition leads to less expensive dealer services is
another example of the fact that the nonprice rivahy remaining after resale prices are fixed is an
ineffective form of rivalry. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
[Vol. 1981:417
COMPETITIVE AD VNTA GES
consumer demand even without any special inducements by the manu-
facturer.75 Systematic resale price-fixing therefore cannot be explained
by the dealer-services rationale.
This is not to say that there is no free-rider problem in the show-
room example-there is. And overcoming the problem through a
dealer's contractual commitments to supply services, some forms of
nonprice vertical restraints, 76 or other means77 should be permitted.
But the fact that dealers whose prices are fixed have showrooms does
not prove that the showrooms result from price-fixing.
Two further arguments are commonly made to show that resale
price maintenance induces dealer services: the uniformity argument
and the market coverage argument. With respect to the gasoline retail
industry, for example, Professor Bork argues that the oil companies
have a legitimate interest in ensuring that their retail outlets provide a
uniformly high level of service78 because a high level of service creates
good will, which in turn induces repeat sales. Without price restraints,
goes the argument, some dealers may ignore service, taking a free ride
on the good will created by the dealers who do give service, degrading
the brand's image, and destroying its good will. With price restraints,
dealers will engage in service competition.
Concededly, oil companies have an interest in ensuring that deal-
ers do not degrade their products by providing poor service. That is
why contractual commitments by the dealer to provide services are en-
forceable,79 and why Sylvania permits restrictions that keep gasoline
75. If a free-rider problem does not exist, the value of services to consumers can be appropri-
ated only by sellers who offer the services. In this circumstance, to allow a manufacturer to induce
dealer services would misallocate resources by requiring consumers to pay for more services than
they desire.
76. See note 87 infra.
77. A manufacturer has several ways other than contractual commitments to overcome the
free-rider problem, including customer restrictions (which, if lawful, permit a manufacturer to
restrict distribution to dealers that provide the services desired by the manufacturer), direct pay-
ments to dealers who provide the desired services, and the direct provision of services by manufac-
turers themselves. Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 22-23; Teiser, supra note 23, at 92-94 (arguing,
however, that these alternatives are too costly or ineffective to be meaningful). None of these
methods is costless, but in view of the inability of resale price maintenance to overcome the free-
rider problem, they are the only means available.
78. Bork, The Rule of Reason, supra note 23, at 454-56.
79. See, eg., Frisard v. Texaco, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. La. 1979); Malone v. Crown
Central Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1979); D & M Distribs., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
1970 Trade Cas. 73,099 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Dealer terminators in the petroleum industry are now
regulated by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2805, 2821-2824, 2841 (Supp. H 1978)), which permits terminations for
"failure by the franchisee to comply with any provision of the franchise, which provision is both
reasonable and of material significance to the franchise relationship ....... 15 U.S.C.
§ 2802(b)(2)(A) (Supp. U 1978).
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out of the hands of low quality dealers.8 0 But resale price maintenance
does not ensure competition to provide services, much less a uniform
level of service; an analysis of the gasoline retail trade shows why.
Consider three types of consumers: first, those who investigate the
type of service they will get before they buy; second, repeat customers,
who buy from a dealer on the basis of past experience with that dealer;
and third, customers who want service but buy from one dealer on the
basis of an earlier experience with a different dealer of the same brand.
For consumers who shop for gasoline by investigating in advance the
services they will get, and for repeat customers, free riding is impossi-
ble; consumers will shop and pay for the services they want. The need
to impose resale price maintenance to stop free riding arises, therefore,
only if customers purchase gasoline on the basis of their past experi-
ence with a particular brand, rather than on the basis of their experi-
ence with a particular station. Even in this situation, however, dealers
can continue to take a free ride after resale prices are fixed: they can
provide poor service and simply pocket that portion of the dealer mar-
gin that other dealers invest in providing service and generating good
will. It is thus irrelevant to say in this example that "any dealer who
did not [compete on a service basis] would lose business."'s The loss of
business would come only from careful shoppers and repeat custom-
ers-those for whom free riding is impossible, and for whom the mar-
ket would provide services without resale price maintenance.
An alternate argument for resale price maintenance in the gasoline
industry and other industries8 2 states that uniform price levels permit a
manufacturer to sell to many outlets, including some inefficient ones,
and thus achieve a market saturation that puts the product within the
convenient reach of consumers.8 3 Gasoline, under this view, is a con-
venience good because consumers want it where and when they need it
80. See, eg., Reno West Coast Dist. Co. v. The Mead Corp., 613 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979). See also Comment, Reeal Gasoline Franchise Terminations and
Nonrenewals Under Title I of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 1980 DuKE L.J. 522.
81. Bork, The ule of Reason, supra note 23, at 455. As Professor Bork recognizes, id. 456
n.161, the market itself generally promotes the manufacturer's interest in uniformity: dealers are
induced to give services in order to retain the patronage of their many repeat customers, and
because they cannot discriminate between repeat and one-time customers, they must give the same
services to alL The manufacturer's concern with the free-rider problem arises, therefore, only
when the dealer is indifferent to repeat customers or when repeat customers are indifferent to
services-both unlikely occurrences.
82. See, ag., P. AREEDA, supra note 24, at 503-04; M. PORTER, supra note-33, at 66; L. SULLI-
vAN, supra note 24, at 382-83. The Chicago-schcol writers do not discuss this argument in the
context of resale price maintenance, presumably because they have rejected it.
83. This argument is refuted, in the context of nonprice vertical restraints, in Comanor, supra
note 22, at 1430.
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and are therefore as likely to have their purchasing decisions influenced
by availability as by price or services. Resale price maintenance there-
fore supposedly serves the manufacturer's and the consumer's interest
in ensuring availability. Increased convenience makes up for the value
consumers lose from the lack of price competition; if it did not, the
manufacturer would not fix prices.
This argument misses an important point. If gasoline is really a
convenience good, consumers will not shop between stations on the ba-
sis of price, so that intrabrand competition will not be strong enough
either to drive prices down or to force inefficient gasoline dealers out of
business. The manufacturer therefore need not restrain price competi-
tion to keep inefficient dealers in the market and ensure adequate mar-
ket coverage. Consumers who want convenience will pay for it and
keep inefficient dealers in business.
To be sure, some consumers value convenience and others value
price competition. Those who value price competition might force
dealers of the same brand to compete against one another, driving the
inefficient dealers out of business and depriving the other consumers of
the convenience they value. This possibility does not, however, explain
or justify resale price maintenance. First, if the manufacturer set the
resale price too high, consumers who value price competition might
switch to other brands. If so, the manufacturer would be acting against
his interest because the value of convenience to the consumers who
liked convenience must have been less than the value of price competi-
tion to those consumers who valued price competition. Had it not been
less, the market would have supplied more convenience. 84 The second
possibility is that after the imposition of resale price maintenance, those
consumers who value price competition might continue to buy the
same brand, but at the higher, fixed price, permitting the manufacturer
to satisfy those consumers who like convenience without diverting
price-sensitive consumers to other brands. If consumers value conven-
ience, it makes economic sense for a manufacturer to subsidize other-
wise inefficient stations to ensure convenience, but the manufacturer
should pay for the subsidy out of his own pocket, rather than that of
consumers who value price competition. Intrabrand competition can-
not threaten his ability to serve those customers who are willing to pay
for convenience; he therefore need not restrain intrabrand competition
to provide that convenience. Of course, the gasoline producer may
want to impose resale price maintenance to increase his own profits and
84. That is, those "inefficient" dealers who are nonetheless convenient will not compete on
the basis of price for sales to consumers who shop primarily by price, but will instead attract
consumers who value convenience and are willing to pay higher prices for it.
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use those profits to subsidize inefficient dealers, but that would be no
more legitimate or pro-competitive than if he fixed prices with his com-
petitors in order to finance more convenient service. Price restraints in
this situation ought to be illegal.
In short, because resale price maintenance does not overcome the
free-rider problem, it cannot induce dealer services that the free market
does. not provide. The dealer-services rationale thus fails to explain
resale price maintenance. The competitive-advantages rationale, by
contrast, does explain resale price maintenance. A manufacturer will
permit his dealers to earn a margin that finances the level of services
necessary for effective interbrand competition; dealers are unlikely to
find additional nonprice competition to be an effective form of in-
trabrand rivalry, and it will not occur.85 Thus, when a manufacturer
fixes resale prices he generally need not fear that nonprice competition
between his dealers will erode dealer margins and put pressure on him
to lower his price to dealers; resale price maintenance eliminates all
forms of interdealer competition that threaten a manufacturer's profit.
Under any welfare analysis, therefore, the per se rule against resale
price maintenance is sound.8 6
B. Nonprice Restrictions.
In contrast to price restrictions, nonprice restrictions have two
characteristics that justify the more sympathetic treatment they receive
under the antitrust laws.
First, because nonprice restrictions stop both price and nonprice
competition, they can be used to overcome the free-rider problem.87
Their imposition may therefore be explained by the dealer-services ra-
tionale, and they cannot be presumed to be anticompetitive. Second,
85. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
86. The per se rule should not be applied, however, to restraints that are really territorial
restrictions, Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (extra-territorial sales permitted at above list prices), nor when
the price restraint is ancillary to beneficial integration. Bork, The Pule ofReaon, supra note 23, at
457-64.
87. The utility of nonprice restrictions in overcoming the free-rider problem is well estab-
lished. Airtight territorial restrictions, which stop all intrabrand competition, see note 89 Infra,
would, if successfully imposed at the dealer level, stop the kind of nonprice, free-rider effect that
occurs when price-fixing is employed and would thus overcome the free-rider problem. Restric-
tions on dealer locations may also separate dealers enough to avoid the kind of free-rider effect
that diminishes important dealer services. Restrictions that permit a manufacturer to sell only to
outlets that meet service standards the manufacturer desires are even more likely to facilitate
dealer services. See Williamson, supra note 23, at 975-79. Indeed, when a manufacturer seeks to
ensure consumer services through contracts with his dealers, customer restrictions are necessary to
keep the merchandise from those who refuse to agree to the contracts.
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nonprice restraints differ widely in their types and effects; some place
only minimal restraints on intrabrand competition.88 For nonprice re-
straints, therefore, a court must base a finding of anticompetitive effect
on an appraisal of the circumstances in which the restraints are im-
posed.
The question arises, however, whether those nonprice restrictions
that foreclose all intrabrand competition-for example, airtight cus-
tomer or territorial restrictions89-- can be presumed to be always an-
ticompetitive. That presumption cannot be made. 90  Airtight
restrictions are often imposed on distributors, not on dealers.91 As long
as intrabrand competition among dealers remains unfettered, a dealer's
incentive to stop carrying low-profit brands will force distributors to
reduce prices to dealers in order to compete for dealer outlets, just as
manufacturers do.92 A restraint on a distributor's territory, without
more, will therefore not stop intrabrand competition among dealers
88. For example, area-of-primary-responsibility clauses and profit pass-over provisions, see
note 2 supra, may be administered so as to overcome free-riding intrabrand competition only,
without restraining socially useful forms of intrabrand competition. Similarly, the effect of loca-tion restrictions, see note 2 supra, on intrabrand competition will depend on how far apart dealers
are separated and on the willingness of customers to travel to the dealers. For these nonprice
restraints, at least, a finding of anticompetitive effect must be based on an appraisal of the circum-
stances in which they are imposed. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECrIoN, supra note 2, at 20-
25.
89. Restrictions are airtight when potential buyers of a brand have only one source to turn to.
Customer restrictions are airtight when only one of a manufacturer's dealers is permitted to trade
with each customer;, territorial restrictions are airtight when the territorial boundaries are closed
and not overlapping; location restrictions are airtight when the dealers are separated by more
distance than consumers are able or willing to travel to shop for the merchandise.
90. But cf. Pitofsky, supra note 5 (arguing that a per se rule should be applicable because
airtight restrictions are likely to arise from dealer pressure, and because those that can be ex-
plained by the dealer-services rationale are likely to be unidentifiable and unimportant).
91. See, ag., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (airtight restric-
tions were imposed only on distributors; the customer and location restrictions on dealers appar-
ently were not airtight), overruled inpart, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(1977); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) (airtight territories on distributors are
lawful only under the rule of reason). But see White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963) (airtight restrictions on both dealers and distributors); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963) (dealers were assigned territories but were permitted to sell to customers
coming to them from outside the territory). See Note, supra note 56, at 803.
92. See text accompanying note 56 supra. On the other hand, there may be circumstances in
which a dealer is unable, as a matter of marketing realities, to stop selling low-profit brands, in
which event intrabrand competition between distributors may be important for dealers and con-
sumers. This may have been the case inln re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978). For example,
a supermarket might carry a low-profit item of frequent purchase, like a particular brand of bread
or soft drink, because consumers would not shop there at all otherwise. Congress reversed the
Coca-Cola decision in legislation authorizing exclusive territories for bottlers if there is "substan-
tial and effective interbrand competition." See Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3503 (West Supp. 1981).
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and should not be held per se unlawful.93 Moreover, the dealers' bar-
gaining power over distributors makes it unlikely that a per se rule can
be justified by a distributor-cartel theory. In order to deprive dealers of
choices, a distributor cartel would have to include virtually all brands
and would thus be both rare, because it would be unstable, and easily
identifiable.
In sum, nonprice restraints should be analyzed under the rule of
reason; section III addresses how that analysis should proceed.
III. TRANSFORMING THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE RULE OF REASON
Although it is too soon to discern whether a single, coherent rule-
of-reason standard is being developed in the post-Sylvania cases,94
many commentators95 and most courts follow a structural approach:
they balance the defendant's market share, a surrogate measure of the
vigor of interbrand competition, against an evaluation of whether the
restraint promotes dealer services.96 The lower the market share, the
easier it is to justify the restraint. This symmetry, however, is imper-
fect; courts appear to be influenced by their own apriori evaluation of
the dealer-services rationale and allocate the burden of proof and the
burden of persuasion accordingly. Some easily accept the dealer-serv-
ices argument and give it overriding weight,97 while others--such as the
93. When airtight territorial restraints are imposed on dealers, the presumption that their
effect is anticompetitive becomes greater. Even so, however, the possibility of a legitimate free-
rider problem to be overcome by the restraints makes any apriori generalization about their com-
petitive effect impossible.
94. Many of the post-Sylvania cases merely reversed and remanded decisions made under
the Schwinn per se rule. See, eg., General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568 F.2d 1147
(7th Cir. 1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977);
Florida Harvestore, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 561 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1977).
See also National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1978)
(affirming a directed verdict against a plaintiff who had relied on the per se rule), cer. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979); Lucas Hoist & Equip. Co. v. Eaton Corp., 76 F.R.D. 661 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,776, at 73,208 (N.D. I1. 1977)
(vacating the final judgment).
95. See the commentators cited in note 26 supra.
96. See, ag., Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md.
1980), aj'd 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981).
97. See, ag., Cowley v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965
(1980). Two courts have granted summary judgment against plaintiffs challenging intrabrand re-
straints. See Golden Gate Acceptance Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1979) (location clause is lawful where the parties agreed to it and the manufacturer's intent was to
provide an effective sales and service network); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461
F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (on remand, the court held Sylvania's location clause pro-competi-
tive).
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Federal Trade Commission 98-view the dealer-services argument as
suspect. 99 In any event, the rule-of-reason standard generally applied
gives the jury wide discretion to arrive at its own assessment of compet-
itive effects.1l°
The focus on market share is basically sound, but the competitive-
advantages rationale makes the analysis more accurate. Two prelimi-
nary observations must be made. First, because theories explaining in-
trabrand restraints differ in their assumptions about a manufacturer's
motive for imposing restraints, one is tempted to measure the effect of a
restraint by asking why the manufacturer imposed it. Focusing on sub-
jective motive, however, is risky and ineffectual: not only can evidence
of purpose be manipulated, but the evidence is usually ambiguous. A
sounder analysis would identify the most likely effect of the restraint by
focusing on objective evidence concerning the nature of intrabrand
competition, relying on evidence of subjective intent only to illuminate
the objective facts. 101 For example, a relevant question is whether a
significant free-rider problem really exists, not only whether the manu-
facturer believes one to exist.
Second, analyzing the effect of intrabrand restraints does not re-
quire the loss of intrabrand competition to be balanced against a gain
in interbrand competition. 10 2 Dealer services may increase the vigor of
interbrand competition by making a product more attractive, but that is
an incidental benefit: the real issue remains whether the loss of in-
trabrand competition itself injures or benefits potential consumers of
the brand in question. Those consumers are injured by the restraint if,
without obtaining more services, they are denied intrabrand choices
that are sources of consumer welfare, but are benefited if dealer serv-
ices increase.
98. In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978); Beltone Elecs. Corp., Administrative Law
Judge Decision, [1980] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,726.
99. See, -g, Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing and
dismising the free-rider argument for failure of proof).
100. See First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir.), cert. dented,
447 U.S. 924 (1980); Reno-West Coast Distribution Co. v. Mead Corp., 613 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); Del Rio Distrib. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
101. "[G]ood intentions will [not] save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse;
but knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences." Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
102. The Supreme Court's contrary assumption impeded the growth of coherent antitrust doe-
trine. Balancing interbrand against intrabrand competition was rejected by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), but has since become acceptable. See
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
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In theory, one could analyze the competitive effect of intrabrand
restraints by identifying cases of genuine dealer cartels and holding
them unlawful, and looking at the remaining cases for changes in the
dealers' margins. If restraints increased those margins, the effects
would be presumptively pro-competitive: rational manufacturers
would not allow their dealers greater gross profits unless those profits
were used to increase dealer services. If restraints left dealers' margins
unaffected or decreased, the effects would be presumptively anticompe-
titive because intrabrand competition would have been restrained with-
out the dealers' obtaining any extra money to spend on added services.
Unfortunately, distinguishing dealer cartels from manufacturer-in-
itiated restraints is difficult,103 and evaluating changes in dealers' mar-
gins is nearly impossible, 1° making that approach unworkable. The
problem of distinguishing dealer cartels from manufacturer-initiated
restraints can be avoided, however, by refining the current approach
that focuses on market share. Restraints imposed under the competi-
tive-advantages rationale have the same adverse effects as those im-
posed under the dealer-cartel rationale; the two differ only with respect
to the level-dealer or manufacturer-at which excess profits are
earned. Because both are likely to occur only if the product in question
has enough market power 05 from differentiation to make the restraints
profitable, the two rationales can usefully be treated together. A work-
able approach would therefore examine the circumstances of the re-
straint to determine whether a manufacturer's market power or his
desire for additional dealer services is the more likely explanation for
the restraint. 1°6 If the former, the restraints should be unlawful; if the
latter, they should be lawful.
103. See note 38 supra.
104. Several of the essays in REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, supra note 33, summarize studies
attempting to assess the effect of resale price maintenance on dealer margin and refer to the mea-
surement problems. Id. at 55, 99-100. See also Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in
Antitrust: The ReaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. Rnv. 994, 1007-08 (1979) (noting the difficulty of
measuring and evaluating changes in profitability).
105. In this context, the term "market power" is synonymous with the term "competitive ad-
vantages": both denote a situation in which one brand is more attractive or less costly to produce
than rival brands, giving that brand's manufacturer at least a short-run opportunity to earn more-
than-competitive profits.
106. The applicability of either the competitive-advantages or the dealer-cartel rationale de-
pends also on the degree to which intrabrand competition is eliminated by the restraint. Airtight
territorial and customer restrictions, see note 89 supra, eliminate all intrabrand competition. Lo-
cation restrictions should be presumed to be airtight when they separate dealers by more than the
average distance consumers are willing to shop for goods; location restrictions separating dealers
by a lesser distance should be evaluated to see whether some significant class of consumers shops
between the dealers in a way that constrains the dealers' behavior. Area-of-primary-responsibility
clauses, see note 88 supra, are neutral unless administered in a way that restricts sales outside the
areas. See, eg., Reed Bros. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975) (enforcement of ship-
ping policies and rebate agreements make it economically impossible to sell outside an area of
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A. Market Power.
Elasticity of demand directly measures differentiation, and hence
market power, 10 7 but elasticity defies accurate measurement'0 8 and
therefore fails as an analytical tool. Another measure of market power
is a comparison of a product's marginal cost with its selling price; a
price substantially and persistently above marginal cost suggests a high
degree of market power. But marginal costs are also difficult to deter-
mine, 10 9 so this method, too, fails the test of practicality.
Antitrust cases have evolved the concept of "relevant" market to
assess market power. 0 Although "market share in a relevant maiket"
and "market power" are not synonymous,"' in practice the relevant
market concept can reasonably, if roughly, measure market power in
primary responsibility), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976); Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland,
Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5ih Cir.) (area-of-primary responsibility clauses enforced by "silent under-
standing" and "course of dealing"), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973). Cf. Response of Carolina,
Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 161,045 (5th Cir. 1976) (territorial confinement
may be inferred from higher royalty payments on sales outside area of primary responsibility);
Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1975) (territorial confinement may be
inferred from assigned areas and resulting conduct). Profit pass-over provisions, see note 88
supra, unduly restrict intrabrand competition to the extent that they more than compensate for the
goodwill used by the dealer entering the protected territory. See, e.g., Superior Bedding Co. v.
Serta Assocs., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-51 (N.D. Ili. 1972).
107. Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 939-43.
108. Schmalensee, supra note 104, at 1007, described the difficulties in the context of the
FTC's ReaLemon decision (In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978)):
If prices have not varied enough, historical data may not contain information from
which reliable estimates of [elasticity] can be derived; and in most situations this elastic-
ity may vary with both the level of price charged and the length of time over which buyer
response to price changes is measured .... [Elasticity], as defined in the textbooks,
measures the sensitivity of demand for a firm's product to changes in the firm's own
price, assuming that all other prices in the economy remain constant. Changes in
eaLemon's price, however, might have induced changes in the prices of other brands of
processed lemon juice, and perhaps even in the price of fresh lemons. If these prices
affected the demand for ReaLemon's output, the price elasticity of demand relevant to
ReaLemon's decisionmaking must have reflected its expectations about the changes in
competitors' prices that ReaLemon's actions would provoke and its assumptions about
the effect of those changes on the demand for ReaLemon's product. Expectations of this
cost may be a major determinant of the markup over marginal cost actually selected, but
they cannot be readily measured by an outside observer.
109. See Schmalensee, sufpra note 104, at 1006. See also Posner, Oigopolistic Pricing Suits,
supra note 60, at 910.
110. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (holding a merger viola-
tive of the Clayton Act); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (a
monopoly case under the Sherman Act).
I11. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
(the court gave some, but not conclusive, weight to the market share), a f'dper curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954). The problems of market definition are helpfully discussed in Schmalensee, supra note
104, at 1004-16. Of the many other general discussions of market definition see R. POSNER, supra
note 35, at 125-34; F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 59-61.
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monopolization and merger cases, where market power is of concern
only if it is substantial. In measuring the significance of intrabrand
competition, however, the relevant market concept is much less satis-
factory because it does not identify firms or products that have market
power of less than substantial proportions. To the extent that the mar-
ket definition includes products that are not close substitutes, it under-
estimates the market power of individual manufacturers in that market
and thus fails to disclose market power derived from product differenti-
ation.112
To determine whether a merger between the Coca-Cola Company
and another soft drink company is lawful, for example, the "soft drink"
market may be an appropriate relevant market." 3 It may not, how-
ever, make sense to include all soft drinks in the relevant market if the
issue is whether the loss of intrabrand competition among Coca-Cola
bottlers is significant for consumers. If consumers do not consider the
cola alternatives to Coca-Cola to be good substitutes, intrabrand com-
petition among Coca-Cola bottlers may be more significant than inter-
brand competition in keeping prices low."14
In short, a correct evaluation of intrabrand restrictions requires
that the relevant product market be defined narrowly. One must deter-
mine whether a firm-because of product differentiation or some other
advantage over its rivals-has a degree of discretionary power that
makes consumer choice between outlets selling that firm's product an
important source of consumer welfare." 5 The factors that go into this
analysis will be the same as those used for traditional market defini-
tion," 6 because the underlying question--the existence of market
112. In most monopoly and merger cases, the efficiencies of firm size and integration mean
that is is only worthwhile to attack substantial disparities between price and cost, so that relatively
broad market definitions may be acceptable. Compare United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (market defined broadly in a monopolization case) with United States
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (minimal integration may have justified
the Court's narrow product market definition). By contrast, restrictions on intrabrand competition
that produce no efficiencies are worth attacking even when they result in relatively less disparity
between price and cost.
113. See, eg., FTC v. Pepsi Co., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973).
114. This appears to have been the approach taken by the Federal Trade Commission in In re
Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), in which, without defining a relevant market, the Commis-
sion found that although Coca-Cola is "not devoid of interbrand competition, nevertheless Coca-
Cola and allied product prices have great competitive significance in the marketplace." Id. at 619.
See also Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
115. See, eg., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 857 (6th Cir. 1964) ("significant product
differentiation increases somewhat the importance of intrabrand competition between distributors
and increases correspondingly the required justification for abolishing it").
116. See, ag., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (listing "industry or
public recognition, . . the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facili-
ties, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors" (foot-
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power-remains the same. But the issue should be whether other prod-
ucts are close, almost perfect, substitutes for the product on which in-
trabrand restrictions have been imposed.
Market power may derive from a manufacturer's cost advantage,
as well as from his product's differentiation. Thus costs should be an
element in the market-power analysis. Furthermore, analysis of the
relevant market for a brand may be deceptive if a second brand looks
like a good substitute for the first only because the price of the first has
risen so far above its cost that consumers are induced to switch
brands." 7 Costs should be examined for this reason as well.
B. Dealer Services.
After determining that either the competitive-advantages theory or
the dealer-cartel theory explains a restraint, one must weigh that deter-
mination against the possibility that the restraint increased dealer serv-
ices. Because it is difficult to determine directly that intrabrand
restraints have increased dealer services, the best technique is to deter-
mine whether the circumstances that make the dealer-services explana-
tion a valid one are present in a particular case. In the context of
nonprice restraints, dealer-service arguments usually fall into four cate-
gories-the need to overcome a free-rider problem, to obtain market
penetration, to encourage dealer investment, and to ensure product
quality and safety. The circumstances that make each of these argu-
ments sound or unsound are examined separately.
1. Free riding. The free-rider problem exists only when a dealer
provides services with respect to a particular product,"18 the services
potentially benefit rival dealers,119 and other dealers have the incentive
and ability to profit from the first dealer's provision of services. If these
conditions do not exist, free riding is not a problem and manufacturers
should not argue that it is.
note omitted)). A court might also determine the existence of product differentiation by
determining whether a brand's share of the relevant market changes when relative prices within
the market change. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 217 (1959).
117. R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 128; Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case andthe New
Competition, 45 AM. ECON. Rlv. 29, 57-63 (1955); Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane
Case, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 281, 309 (1956).
118. When the activity promotes a particular dealer--rather than a particular product-other
dealers will be unable to take a free ride on the activity and there will thus be no disincentive to
engage in it. Telser, supra note 23, at 89. Dealer advertising may, of course, be related to both the
dealer and the product, in which event some free riding may be possible.
119. See Posner, supra note 16, at 6. See note 42 supra.
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Free riding is not a problem, for example, when a dealer confines
his services, such as maintenance and repair, to those customers who
buy from that dealer. Nor does it exist when dealers do not provide
any customer services, nor when a manufacturer undertakes most or all
of the activities that satisfy or generate consumer demand, nor when
the manufacturer ensures through contract that all his dealers will sup-
ply the necessary services. Moreover, dealers have a natural incentive,
regardless of the possibility of free riding, to cultivate a high quality
image for themselves; this is especially true for dealers in multiple
brands, where the amount of services provided for any particular brand
is unlikely to be determined by the size of the dealer margin on that
product. Finally, consumers may be unresponsive to the free-rider pos-
sibility when the cost or time required to identify and patronize free-
riding dealers is high.12o
2. Market penetration. One of the common arguments support-
ing territorial restrictions holds that they increase market penetra-
tion.121 A dealer or distributor may find that the profitability of serving
various types of customers, or customers in different localities, varies
because his costs of serving the customers vary. If he can spread his
costs over all customers in a given area, he can afford to serve otherwise
unprofitable, high-cost buyers. In effect, low-cost customers subsidize
high-cost customers by paying for a disproportionate share of the
jointly incurred costs of distribution. If intrabrand competition were
permitted, however, some of the relatively more lucrative customers
might shift to other dealers or distributors; the possibility of spreading
distribution costs over a large number of outlets would decrease; and
each distributor or dealer would sell to fewer customers.
Although this justification is both difficult to evaluate theoreti-
cally 122 and difficult to discount when raised in a particular case, it ap-
120. The cost of a product includes search costs, which encompass the cost of information
about the product and the cost of time and transportation required to obtain the product. Stigler,
The Economics of Information, 69 J. POLMCAL ECON. 213 (1961).
121. Pitofsky, supra-note 5, at 18, indicates that this may be what the Supreme Court had in
mind in Sylvania when it said that vertical nonprice restraints allow the manufacturer to attract
dealers who will make "the kind of investment in capital and labor that is often required in the
distribution of products unknown to consumers." 433 U.S. at 55. The classic statement of the
market-penetration argument was made in Preston, supra note 23, at 511. See also Warren, Eco-
nomics of Closed Territory Distribution, 2 ANTIRUSr T L. & ECON. REv. 111 (1968).
122. See, eg., Comanor, supra note 22, at 1431:
What is important is not whether these restrictions enhance market coverage or customer
contact, for this they may well do, but rather whether restrictions of this character are
likely to improve the competitive process throuh which resources are allocated to these
activities. While society generally approves of mproved market coverage, it also gener-
ally deplores higher dealer markups and higher costs of distribution. Whether the addi-
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pears to be applicable only under several limiting conditions, namely
that (1) the cost of selling .to customers varies widely; (2) the cost of
selling to some of the customers is so high that no sales could be made
unless the cost could be shared among all customers; and (3) any invad-
ing dealer or distributor selling to low-cost customers would have no
incentive to pick up additional sales by also selling to high-cost custom-
ers. Where these conditions are not met, it is unlikely that territorial
restrictions can be used to increase market penetration.
3. Increasing investment. As a corollary to the dealer-services
theory, it is sometime argued that intrabrand restrictions are justified
because by reducing risk they increase capital investment by dealers; a
manufacturer may in effect guarantee his dealers' investment in fixed
and unmarketable assets by reducing the risks of loss from intrabrand
competition.12 Although the premise of this argument is true--de-
creasing risks will increase investment-the argument should be ac-
cepted only if the risks are created by a free-rider problem.
The general argument that the risks flowing from competition
should be reduced in order to increase investment is, of course, anti-
thetical to the notion of a competitive market. Absent a market failure
like the free-rider problem, the proper amount of investment is that
which reflects competitive risks and consumers' willingness to compen-
sate for those risks. Inducing a greater amount of investment misallo-
cates resources by drawing more resources into an industry than
consumers desire. Thus, antitrust doctrine has never generally ac-
cepted the argument that private restrictions on competition can be jus-
tified as necessary to provide more investment, or, for that matter, more
research or more technology, than the market provides. 124
Nonetheless, the dealer-investment argument has validity in nar-
row circumstances. A dealer who agrees with the manufacturer to in-
tional gains are worth the additional costs is, of course, the essence of the problem of
resource allocation-a problem whose solution we normally leave to the marketplace.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Hearings on S. 2549 Before the Subcomm onAnlitrust andMonop-
oly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1088 (1966) (statement of Donald F.
Turner, then-Professor, Harvard School of Law). The market-penetration argument nonetheless
has a strong free-rider aspect that should be considered: sales to less profitable accounts may have
a promotional effect that benefits the invading dealer even though the invading dealer need not
incur the cost of selling to those accounts.
123. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) ("new
manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce
competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is
often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer").
124. See, eg., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass.
1953), qafdper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See also Comanor, supra note 22, at 1428-29; Louis,
Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania, supra note 10, at 296.
Vol. 1981:417]
DUKE LAWJOUR[o8AL
vest in fixed and unmarketable assets may want to protect that
investment by ensuring that the manufacturer does not later undercut
the bargain by himself competing with, or appointing a new dealer to
compete with, the contracting dealer.125 The manufacturer assumes, in
this respect, the same position as the seller of a business who transfers
the good will of the business to the buyer--they are both possible free-
riders because they both have the possibility of profiting from an ex-
change while denying the fruits of that exchange to the other party. 126
This consideration, however, justifies only restrictions on the man-
ufacturer's freedom. The manufacturer's promise is reasonably neces-
sary to ensure that he cannot appoint a dealer, have the dealer develop
the territory, and then render the dealership valueless by himself com-
peting, or by appointing a new dealer, in that territory. The same con-
siderations hardly justify a manufacturer in protecting an appointed
dealer from competition with pre-existing dealers, because the ap-
pointed dealer takes his dealership subject to the risks of competition.
Unless the restriction keeps the manufacturer from purposefully under-
cutting the good will the dealer develops, the restriction is unnecessary
to induce the proper amount of dealer investment and should therefore
be unlawful.
4. Quality andsafety. Even under the Schwinn per se rule courts
accepted the argument that intrabrand restrictions might be necessary
to maintain product quality or to promote safety;127 doubtless, after
Sylvania the courts will continue to do so.' When a product can be
safely used only by professionals, a manufacturer should be allowed to
restrict distribution to professionals. When product quality diminishes
with shipping time, a manufacturer should be allowed to restrict the
shipping distance of the product.
The quality or safety argument sometimes includes, however, the
assertion that intrabrand competition would take away the profits that
dealers need in order to foster quality. In defending its territorial re-
125. See Hearings on S. 598 Before the Subcomn on Anuitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights
of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-43 (1979) (statement of Victor P.
Goldberg, Professor of Economics, University of California at Davis).
126. See National Soe'y ofProfessional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Mitchell
v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (ch. 1711).
127. See Cooper Liquor v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976); Tripoli Co. v.
Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.) (upholding a restriction to professional use only), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 831 (1970); Mitchell v. United States Surgical Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,879 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (upholding territorial restrictions said to ensure prompt service); Sulmeyer v. Seven-
Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d
1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). In Sylvania, the Court expressly recog-
nized the validity of cases like 2ivooli. 433 U.S. at 55 n.23.
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straints on .bottlers, for example, the Coca-Cola Company argued that
its restrictions increased market penetration and thereby permitted bot-
tlers to ensure the proper inventory turnover at each store.128 Without
the territorial restriction, the company argued, market penetration
would have been diminished, some chain stores would have taken de-
livery at central warehouses, and bottlers could no longer have ensured
that their inventory was properly turned over. To the contrary, how-
ever, because the market normally induces all dealers to maintain their
product quality and thus ensure repeat purchases, such arguments
should be accepted with caution; they should be successful only when
the possible anticompetitive effect of the restraint is minimal, when the
need for dealer services or market penetration is a likely explanation,129
and when quality cannot be maintained by contractual obligations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The failure of antitrust law to provide a workable, coherent, and
settled doctrine applicable to intrabrand restrictions reflects inadequate
understanding of the economics of the subject. Economic analysis usu-
ally assumes that intrabrand restraints directly increase manufacturers'
profits only when imposed by a manufacturers' cartel and assumes that
otherwise they increase dealer margins, either in response to a dealer
cartel or in an attempt to increase dealer services. Although each of
these explanations is valid under some circumstances, they each miss
an important alternative explanation: the competitive-advantages the-
ory. That theory states that a manufacturer profits directly from in-
trabrand restrictions when they enable him to keep his price to dealers
higher than would otherwise be possible. With active intrabrand com-
petition, the dealers' profitability on a particular brand decreases and
the manufacturer can be forced to lower his wholesale price to compen-
sate for his brand's lower profitability in the retail market. Without
active intrabrand competition, the manufacturer can maintain higher
wholesale prices. Restraints imposed under the competitive-advan-
tages rationale decrease consumer welfare and are unjustifiable.
The competitive-advantages rationale helps make antitrust doc-
trine coherent by showing that the Supreme Court in Sylvania correctly
128. See, ag., In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978). The Federal Trade Commission
rejected the argument, finding that to achieve its quality-control objectives, the Coca-Cola Com-
pany could "establish reasonable quality control standards for distribution and storage, including
inventory rotation policies, and may further require that each bottler identify itself on the bottle,
bottle cap, or on the can so that [Cola-Cola] may reasonably monitor compliance with its quality
standards." Id. at 634.
129. See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra.
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distinguished resale price maintenance from nonprice intrabrand re-
straints. The dealer-services theory never explains resale price mainte-
nance, because resale price maintenance does not solve the free-rider
problem and therefore cannot induce desirable services. Resale price
maintenance can be explained only by the competitive-advantages ra-
tionale, or by a cartel rationale, so that the per se rule prohibiting resale
price maintenance is fully justified.
By contrast, nonprice restraints may overcome a free-rider prob-
lem with little anticompetitive effect; they may be explained either by
the dealer-services or the competitive-advantages rationale. Courts
should therefore analyze nonprice restraints under the rule of reason to
determine which rationale better explains the case at hand.
